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Using  a  panel  of 38 economies,  over  the period  2001–2010,  we analyse  the  link  between
different  facets  of  education  and diversiﬁcation  in  international  portfolios.  We  ﬁnd  that uni-
versity education,  mathematical  numeracy,  in addition  to  ﬁnancial  skill,  play  an important
role  in reducing  home  bias.  After  separating  countries  according  to their  level  of  ﬁnancial
development,  we ﬁnd  that  less  developed  economies  with more  university  graduates,  or
with  higher  level  of mathematical  numeracy,  have  lower level  of  local  equity  bias  com-
pared  to more  developed  countries.  We  also  ﬁnd  that  the beneﬁcial  effect  of  education  is
more pronounced  during  the  most  recent  ﬁnancial  crisis,  especially  for  economies  with  less
developed  ﬁnancial  markets.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
A topic of considerable recent interest in international capital markets is the extent to which equity portfolios are con-
entrated in investors’ domestic markets. Investors seem reluctant to reap the full beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation
nd overinvest in their domestic assets rather than in international portfolios. This preference is commonly termed as the
Home bias puzzle’  and has attracted a great amount of attention in the recent literature (see Sercu and Vanpée, 2007, 2012).
ollowing the seminal work of French and Poterba (1991), several authors have documented a number of plausible expla-
ations, which primarily focus on institutional factors or individual investor behaviour (see Lewis, 1999; Karolyi and Stulz,
003; Sercu and Vanpée, 2012 for surveys). However, the role of education in international portfolio diversiﬁcation is less
esearched. Our aim in this paper is to ﬁll this gap by exploring the link between various measures of education and equity
ome bias, paying special attention to the heterogeneity in ﬁnancial development and the most recent ﬁnancial crisis.
The last two decades have seen a phenomenal growth of ﬁnancial instruments and products, as evidenced by a number
f new assets that were developed based on subprime and other mortgages before the 2007–2010 global ﬁnancial crisis.
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However, the ability of investors to make sound ﬁnancial decisions on the basis of these new assets was severely challenged
in the light of the massive losses incurred during this period (see Klapper et al., 2013). This process has underlined the need
for better education and ﬁnancial awareness among citizens, educators, community groups, businesses, policymakers and
government agencies to ensure their ﬁnancial security (see Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Gerardi et al., 2010).
The extant literature on ﬁnancial literacy is concerned with the links between ﬁnancial knowledge, saving and investment
behaviour (see Jappelli and Padula, 2013; Lusardi et al., 2013), and has considered the role of education and ﬁnancial literacy
in many aspects of economic behaviour, both at the micro and the macro level (see Stango and Zinman, 2009; Guiso and
Jappelli, 2005, 2008, for surveys). For example, this literature demonstrates a clear relationship between borrowing and
investment decisions of individuals and a number of researchers have shown that a lack of education and knowledge leads
to poor risk diversiﬁcation and inefﬁcient portfolio allocations (Christelis et al., 2010). At the macro level, economic literacy is
essential for the good and efﬁcient working of the markets and policies. A lack of ﬁnancial knowledge, on the other hand, can
result in an increase of deceitful ﬁnancial practices and unfair competition in ﬁnancial markets (Jappelli, 2010). Therefore,
both micro and macro studies conclude that we  should observe a direct and positive relation between ﬁnancial education
and ﬁnancial decision making (Hilgert et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2011).
One popular ﬁnding in the ﬁnancial literacy literature postulates that formal education matters for the process of ﬁnancial
decision making (see Graham et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2012) and ﬁnancial participation (see Karlsson and Nordén, 2007; Van
Rooij et al., 2011). Education also works through the behavioural patterns of investors. In particular, educated investors
demonstrate a higher level of competence and invest more heavily in foreign equities compared to individuals with lower
levels of education (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Magi, 2009). Thus, knowledgeable, educated and
more ﬁnancially capable people are able to manage their ﬁnances better by making good and proﬁtable decisions for their
economic security and well-being.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge the strands of the literatures on international portfolio diversiﬁcation and education
in order to provide, a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of education on equity holdings, taking into account both the
different degree of ﬁnancial development among economies and the most recent ﬁnancial crisis. The motivation for exploring
the role of education in equity portfolios stems from the fact that education inﬂuences ﬁnancial awareness, knowledge, skills,
attitude and the behaviour of investors to make sound ﬁnancial decisions in order to achieve individual ﬁnancial well-being.
Lack of education and ﬁnancial awareness, on the other hand, can be key reasons behind the lower degree of international
portfolio diversiﬁcation and an increasing reliance on domestic equity portfolios. Hence, education and potentially ﬁnancial
literacy help to reduce information acquisition costs related to foreign investment opportunities, improving the awareness
of the beneﬁts and risks of international portfolio diversiﬁcation.
In our study, we also recognise that education may  not inﬂuence all economies in a similar way. We  allow for the fact
that economies with different levels of ﬁnancial development might respond to improvements in the level of education
differently, since emerging market economies typically ﬁnd it difﬁcult, or prohibitively expensive, to access foreign ﬁnan-
cial markets (Mizen and Tsoukas, 2010; Mizen et al., 2012). However, emerging markets have experienced considerable
development in their ﬁnancial markets over the past few decades accompanied by lower inﬂation, stronger institutions and
creditor rights (Burger and Warnock, 2003, 2006). In addition, the link between different levels of education and portfolio
diversiﬁcation should be more potent during extreme economic events, such as the most recent ﬁnancial crisis. Gerardi et al.
(2010) show that limited ﬁnancial literacy (numerical ability) played an important role in the recent subprime mortgage
crisis in the US. Thus, the link between education and ﬁnancial literacy is likely to be more potent during the ﬁnancial crisis as
it might help in resolving information asymmetries in the economy and improve investors’ competence level and cognitive
abilities.
The value added of the present paper is threefold. First, we consider a direct role of education in inﬂuencing the equity
home bias. In addition to the country-speciﬁc and ﬁnancial indicators previously considered, this study also considers the
impact of different measures of education. This approach complements the existing empirical literature on international
portfolio holdings (see Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 2007; De Moor and Vanpée, 2013), which highlights the effect of
different institutional and ﬁnancial factors, geographical, political and behavioural effects on home bias in international
portfolios.
The second main contribution of this paper is that, using comparable multi-country panel data, we  are able to identify
which countries are more likely to beneﬁt by the reduction in equity home bias from a higher level of education. Intuitively,
we do not expect all countries to be equally affected by education. It is widely accepted that economic literacy differs
extensively across countries and tends to be rather limited in poorer demographic groups (Jappelli, 2010). Countries with
higher levels of education tend to beneﬁt much more from ﬁnancial liberalisation (Bekaert et al., 2001). In this paper, we
test whether there is a differential effect of education on international diversiﬁcation for economies with more and less
developed ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, we  assess whether the education-home bias nexus has evolved over time for economies with more and less
ﬁnancially developed markets. The most recent ﬁnancial crisis has provided fertile ground for analysing the changes and
developments that took place in the ﬁnancial systems of several countries. During the crisis period, markets faced macro-
economic imbalances, liquidity risk and international risk, leading to the possibility of contagion (Arghyrou and Kontonikas,
2012). Hence, there is a need of ﬁnancial awareness among investors to make correct investment decisions during periods
of distress. The pattern of capital ﬂows was vastly heterogeneous across countries during the crisis as investors tried to
reduce their international exposure and accordingly increase their exposure in improved economic conditions (Raddatz and
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chmukler, 2012). This, in turn, resulted in a decline in the assets invested abroad and thus an increase in the proportion of
quity portfolios which are concentrated in the domestic market of investors (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we offer a brief review of the relevant literature. In Section 3 we  describe
he econometric modelling strategy. We  present the data used in our empirical analysis along with summary statistics in
ection 4, and we report the econometric results in Section 5. In Section 6 we subject our main models to a battery of
dditional tests and we provide concluding remarks in Section 7.
. Review of existing literature
There is a wide literature which highlights the advantages of international portfolio diversiﬁcation utilising US data. These
tudies show that diversiﬁcation of portfolios reduces risk (Solnik, 1974) and that beneﬁts can be attained by investing in
merging markets (Harvey, 1995). Rowland and Tesar (2004) show that investments in stocks of multinational ﬁrms can be
roﬁtable and hence, utility gains from the addition of international assets to a benchmark portfolio of domestic equities
re substantial. However, for investors in emerging markets, international diversiﬁcation is likely to be more beneﬁcial as
hese countries typically face higher risk (Driessen and Laeven, 2007). Despite the gains from international diversiﬁcation,
nvestors still tend to invest more in their domestic stock and bond markets.
Since the path breaking work of French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995), who provided evidence of
quity home bias of around 94%, 98% and 82% of their total equity investments in the US, Japan and the UK respectively,
everal justiﬁcations have been offered in the literature for the existence of the equity home bias puzzle. These include
nstitutional explanations, such as hedging possibilities. For instance, studies by Adler and Dumas (1983) and Cooper and
aplanis (1994) identiﬁed domestic risk hedging as an important explanation for home bias. Other proposed explanations
nclude hedging foreign exchange risk (Fidora et al., 2007; Mishra, 2011), transaction costs and barriers to international
nvestments (Stulz, 1981), information asymmetries (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Ahearne et al., 2004; Ivkovic and Weisbenner,
005), geographical proximity and familiarity (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Kilka and Weber, 2000), corporate governance
nd transparency (Gelos and Wei, 2005) and behavioural explanations such as familiarity with one’s domestic companies,
ptimism about domestic equity market and asymmetric expectations (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2003). Detailed literature
eviews on home bias are provided by Lewis (1999) and Sercu and Vanpée (2012). The consensus is that equity home bias
s a complex phenomenon and is probably caused by a combination of behavioural and institutional biases.
In the ﬁnancial capability literature, Bernheim (1995, 1998) highlighted that most individuals lack basic ﬁnancial knowl-
dge and numeracy. Numerous surveys have emphasised that speciﬁc sub-groups in the US population and elsewhere have
ery low levels of economic and ﬁnancial literacy (Hilgert et al., 2003; Agnew and Szykman, 2005; Lusardi and Mitchell,
011a,b,c). Studies generally conﬁrm the importance of ﬁnancial literacy training by showing a direct and positive relation
etween ﬁnancial education and ﬁnancial decision making (Hilgert et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2011). Education also helps in
ncreasing participation in stock market investments (Van Rooij et al., 2011) and diversiﬁcation of portfolios (Campbell,
006). In addition, it inﬂuences borrowing decisions and retirement planning (Cole et al., 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007;
lapper and Panos, 2011).
Education further impacts on ﬁnancial behaviour and educated investors demonstrate greater optimism towards ﬁnancial
arkets (Puri and Robinson, 2007), better planning in terms of retirement and making crucial ﬁnancial decisions (Lusardi
nd Mitchell, 2007, 2011a,b). Since the end of the 1980s, there has been more deregulation and ﬁnancial innovation resulting
n more availability of ﬁnancial investment options in equities. Many researchers have found that a lack of knowledge leads
o poor risk diversiﬁcation, inefﬁcient portfolio allocations and a low savings rate. Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007) analysed the
umerical ability and other aspects of cognitive ability among a sample of older adults in England and found that numeracy
evels are strongly correlated with understanding of pension arrangements, perceived ﬁnancial security, retirement saving
easures and investment portfolios.
The international evidence highlights the existence of very low levels of ﬁnancial literacy around the world. In an earlier
urvey, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2005) conﬁrmed that widespread ﬁnancial
lliteracy prevails in countries such as Europe, Australia, and Japan. Jappelli (2010) shows wide diversities in the levels of
conomic literacy, pointing out that lower levels of development in stock and credit markets are related with lower levels
f economic literacy.1
The studies discussed above provide a useful background for the linkage between education and equity portfolio diver-
iﬁcation. In the home bias context, very few studies address this issue. Karlsson and Nordén (2007) provide evidence that
igher levels of education are associated with a lower likelihood of home bias, focusing on the portfolios which formed a
art of the Swedish pension plan. Kimball and Shumway (2010) show that ﬁnancial education has signiﬁcant explanatory
ower in home bias and market participation by developing an index of investor sophistication derived from April 2005
urvey of US Consumers. Giofre (2012) also documents the impact of ﬁnancial education and investor protection on equity
ortfolios. Yet, the above studies do not take into account the heterogeneity of ﬁnancial development at the country level,
or do they extend to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. In this paper, we ask how important are various measures of education in
1 In Jappelli’s (2010) study, the statistics of economic literacy range from a score of less than 3 in South Africa, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, and Croatia to a
core of above 7 for Ireland, Finland, and Singapore.
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determining equity portfolios taking into account both the degree of ﬁnancial development and the recent global ﬁnancial
crisis. In the sections that follow we turn to our estimation strategy and data.
3. Empirical implementation
3.1. The baseline speciﬁcation
In order to establish whether different measures of education affect international diversiﬁcation in equity markets, we
model the determinants of equity home bias and check whether education is a signiﬁcant determinant. Following the recent
literature on international diversiﬁcation (see Chan et al., 2005; Mondria and Wu,  2013) our empirical models are estimated
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).2 We  also generate a dummy  variable to capture ﬁnancial development (Fin.Dev), which
takes the value one if a country’s stock market capitalisation is greater than the mean and zero otherwise. The Fin.Dev
dummy  enters on its own in order to gauge the direct impact of ﬁnancial development on equity home bias. We  consider
the following baseline model:
EHBit = a0 + a1Eduit + a2Fin.Devit + a3it + eit, (1)
where i = 1, 2, . . .,  N refers to the cross-section of units (countries in this case), t = 1, 2, . . .,  T refers to the time period, EHBit
is the dependent variable of equity home bias for country i and year t, respectively. Edu denotes education in country i
and year t measured in three different ways using country averages of tertiary education, mathematical numeracy taken
from OECD-PISA test scores and the degree of managers’ ﬁnancial skills.  is the vector of country-speciﬁc factors which
includes macro-economic conditions, information related-variables, ﬁnancial liberalisation, ﬁnancial market development,
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and ﬁnancial factors and ﬁnally, foreign exchange risk. eit is a disturbance term which varies with
time and across different countries. In order to control for cyclical factors originating from the business cycle we  include
time dummies in our regressions. We  also include country dummies that take into account cross-country differences. Finally,
standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation across countries.
The dependent variable is the home bias measured for equity markets. Following Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Sercu and
Vanpée (2007, 2012) and De Moor and Vanpée (2013), the equity home bias in a country is calculated as the difference
between the proportion of the total equity portfolio invested in home equity and the relative weight of the domestic stock
market in the global equity market capitalisation. Thus,
EHBit =
EQit
TEQit
− MEQit
WEQit
, (2)
where EQit is domestic equity holdings of investors in country i at time t, TEQit is the total equity portfolio held by the
investors in country i at time t, MEQit is equity market capitalisation of country i for time t and WEQit is the total world equity
market capitalisation.
The effects of education on various aspects of ﬁnancial behaviour have been analysed in previous studies (Kennickell
et al., 1996; Karlsson and Nordén, 2007; Stango and Zinman, 2009). The upshot is that education is associated with ﬁnancial
sophistication and irreprehensible ﬁnancial behaviour. Kimball and Shumway (2010) show that investor sophistication has
signiﬁcant explanatory power in home bias and market participation.3 Departing from this literature, we employ different
measures of education to capture, for the ﬁrst time, the effect of different levels of formal education and ﬁnance/numeracy
skills on international portfolio diversiﬁcation, paying special attention to the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the different levels
of ﬁnancial architecture.
As already noted, education is measured using three different indicators to ensure the robustness of our results.4 We begin
by employing tertiary school enrolment rates to capture the effect of formal education (Jappelli, 2010).5 We  then employ
two measures of ﬁnancial education/numeracy in the spirit of Jappelli (2010). Speciﬁcally, we allow for a broader deﬁnition
of education by using OECD-PISA test scores which indicates mathematical numeracy.6 We  also measure the availability
of ﬁnancial skills from managers’ surveys. Both ﬁnancial skills and mathematical numeracy are good measures of ﬁnancial
literacy since they are related to three concepts of ﬁnancial knowledge, as identiﬁed by Lusardi and Micthell (2014), these
are numeracy and capacity to perform calculations related to interest rates and understanding the concepts of inﬂation
2 To ensure that our results are not driven by the potential endogeneity in our regressors we also employ instrumental variable (IV) regressions. We instru-
ment  different measures of education using primary education enrolment rates and unemployment rates and other ﬁnancial variables are instrumented
using their own  values lagged twice.
3 Kimball and Shumway (2010) develop an index of investor sophistication using the data from April 2005 Survey of Consumers based on a questionnaire
of  14 questions.
4 Table A.1 in Appendix provides precise deﬁnitions for the measures of education and other variables.
5 The World Bank deﬁnes tertiary education as university-level education that includes undergraduate or postgraduate education (e.g. universities,
colleges, technical training institutes, community colleges, nursing schools, research laboratories, centres of excellence and distance learning centres). We
do  not take into account primary education as there is a weak relationship between equity home bias and primary education, which is also documented in
the  scatter plots presented in Appendix (see Fig. A.1).
6 In 2012, the OECD carried out a large-scale international study to assess numeracy of young people. This data item, however, contains no historical
values which are vitally important for the panel dimension of our dataset.
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nd risk diversiﬁcation.7 Higher levels of education imply higher levels of ﬁnancial sophistication and investor competence,
herefore, increasing ﬁnancial market participation (Cole et al., 2012). In turn, we expect higher levels of education to be
ssociated with lower levels of home bias in equity markets.
In addition to education, which is our core explanatory variable, we include in vector X a set of control variables that have
een found to explain portfolio diversiﬁcation in previous studies. We  categorise these variables into six groups8:
.1.1. Macro-economic conditions
We begin by using the growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).9 GDP growth can have both positive and negative impacts
n home bias. Countries with fast growing GDP should attract more foreign investments resulting in a decline in the home
ias. On the other hand, countries growing faster are mostly the emerging market economies that face higher risk, thus,
iscouraging foreign investments, resulting in an increase in home bias.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was employed by Chan et al. (2005) as another measure of economic development. It is
easured by net inﬂows of foreign direct stock investment, scaled by GDP. An increase in FDI should have a negative effect
n home bias (Chan et al., 2005). This indicator is important as a country’s level of economic development is likely to affect
he ﬂow of foreign investments in a country.
.1.2. Information-related variables
Following De Moor and Vanpée (2013), trade and the English legal origin are taken as proxies for information asymmetries
nd familiarity, respectively. Trade is calculated as the average of exports and imports scaled by GDP. The English legal origin
s a dummy  variable that takes the value one if the country has English common law as the legal origin, and zero otherwise.
a Porta et al. (2008) showed that a country’s legal origins have a statistically large impact on investor protection which
s associated with improved ﬁnancial development and access to ﬁnance, thus reducing equity home bias. Therefore, both
rade and English legal origin are expected to affect home bias negatively.
Labour force size is likely to inﬂuence individuals’ investment decisions by affecting their risk preferences. It is measured
y the total population in the age group of 15 and older who  are economically active. Several researchers concluded that
lder investors are more experienced, practiced and more likely to diversify their investment portfolios. Hence, labour force
ize and home bias should be negatively correlated, which means that as individuals are economically more active, their
evel of income and diversiﬁcation increases (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2003).
.1.3. Financial liberalisation
Following Mondria and Wu (2010), the Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness is used to measure ﬁnancial liberalisation
nd ﬁnancial openness at the country level. Financial market openness provides incentive for investors to hold foreign
ssets in order to increase gains from diversiﬁcation. Thus, ﬁnancial openness of a country is likely to affect home bias
egatively. This measure is a combination of four binary dummy  variables mentioned in IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
rrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The variables include the presence of multiple exchange rates, the
xistence of restrictions on current account transactions, the existence of restrictions on capital account transactions and
he requirement to surrender of the proceeds of exports. Hence, by structure the Chinn-ito index is a de-jure measure of
nancial openness as it attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions.10
.1.4. Financial market development
Using turnover ratio, domestic credit and stock market capitalisation, we  measure the impact of ﬁnancial market devel-
pment on equity home bias. We  expect to ﬁnd a negative relation between these variables and equity home bias. Market
urnover, which is measured by the turnover ratio, shows an asset’s ability to be sold without causing much movement in
rice and value. Following Levine and Zervos (1996), the turnover ratio helps in measuring market liquidity and transaction
osts.11 According to Bekaert et al. (2007), the effect of liquidity is more distinct in emerging markets where executing
ransactions are time-consuming.
7 Note that Education in Finance, which was  an alternative variable of ﬁnancial education used in Jappelli (2010), was not available to us. The data-set
n  the present study was  downloaded in August 2013 and this particular data item was removed from the database.
8 We have also experimented with the corruption index, as an additional control variable to deal with the concept of governance. This variable, however,
roved to be highly co-linear with both ﬁnancial skills and PISA scores as well as with ﬁnancial openness. We have opted therefore, not to include this
ariable in our speciﬁcations.
9 We also use the log of GDP per capita as a measure of economic development and our results are broadly similar. However, the variable has high
orrelation with PISA scores, tertiary education and ﬁnancial openness. Thus, this variable is not included in the main models.
10 One potential drawback of this index is that investors may ﬁnd loopholes and thus may  escape the capital account restrictions, invalidating the effect
f  capital account restrictions.
11 It is shown that assets with lower liquidity, trade at a lower price relative to their expected cash ﬂows. Thus, illiquid assets command a higher risk
remium and therefore higher expected returns.
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Domestic credit provided by the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP, was used by Rose and Spiegel (2009) and De  Moor
and Vanpée (2013) to measure the domestic ﬁnancial depth. This variable includes all credit to various sectors on a gross
basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net.12
Market capitalisation, as a percentage of GDP, measures the share price times the number of shares outstanding. This
is an efﬁcient measure of stock market size. According to Chan et al. (2005), larger stock markets are more visible, more
recognised and more developed, and therefore are able to attract more foreign equity portfolio investment. Thus, home bias
in a country is likely to decrease with an improvement in a country’s ﬁnancial depth and liquidity.
3.1.5. Diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and ﬁnancial factors
Following Edison and Warnock (2004), we employ the current ratio that signals the ability of ﬁrms to meet short-term
obligations. This ratio is calculated as current assets over current liabilities. Thus, an increase in current ratio should have a
negative impact on home bias as ﬁrms which are more liquid are able to attract higher levels of foreign investments, thus
reducing the home bias.
In addition, we use Leverage, which is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. More indebted companies face
a higher degree of information asymmetries and are associated with a weaker ﬁnancial position. These companies are less
likely to attract foreign investors which minimises their diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and therefore the higher the leverage, the
higher the home bias.
3.1.6. Foreign exchange risk
Following De Moor and Vanpée (2013), we account for foreign exchange rate risk by creating a dummy  (Euro), which
takes the value one if the country is a member of the Euro-area, and zero otherwise. Baele et al. (2007) found that home bias
was lower for the countries that were a part of the European monetary union compared to other countries. Thus, foreign
exchange risk is expected to have a positive effect on home bias.
3.2. The impact of ﬁnancial development
In the next stage, we explore the extent to which different levels of education may  have an impact on the home bias
of countries characterised by different degrees of ﬁnancial development. To do so, we use the degree of stock market
capitalisation as a sorting device. Larger stock markets are considered to have higher mobility of capital, less volatility and
risk and are more internationally integrated (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). Further, investors are attracted towards
more developed stock markets due to the fact that they are characterised by lower transaction costs and higher liquidity
(Chan et al., 2005). The countries in our sample are classiﬁed into more and less ﬁnancially developed on the basis of the
average stock market capitalisation normalised by GDP13 using the dummy  Fin.Dev. This implies that countries above (below)
the mean of stock market capitalisation are more (less) ﬁnancially developed. As the degree of home bias in international
portfolios is higher in less ﬁnancially developed economies, the impact of education and ﬁnancial sophistication on home
bias is expected to be more important in countries with less developed ﬁnancial markets compared to their more developed
counterparts. In order to test this hypothesis, we modify Eq. (1), by including interactions between education (Edu) and the
ﬁnancial development dummy  (Fin.Dev).
EHBit = a0 + a1Eduit ∗ Fin.Devit + a2Eduit ∗ (1 − Fin.Devit) + a3Fin.Devit + a4Xit + eit, (3)
The speciﬁcations above capture the impact of education on economies with different levels of ﬁnancial development. If
the interacted coefﬁcients are statistically different from each other it can be concluded that the impact of education on the
home bias is different between more and less ﬁnancially developed economies.
3.3. Accounting for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods
Having identiﬁed a relationship between different facets of education and home bias for more and less ﬁnancially devel-
oped economies, we then explore whether this linkage has evolved over time. Our sample covers the most recent global
ﬁnancial crisis and it provides an interesting setup to investigate the extent to which, controlling for other factors, home bias
differs in crisis years compared to more tranquil periods. Therefore, we  augment Eq. (3) with a ﬁnancial crisis dummy  (Crisis),
which takes the value one over the period 2007–2010, and zero otherwise. We then interact the education variable with the
Crisis and the Fin.Dev dummies to examine whether the sensitivity of countries’ home bias to different levels of education
differs between crisis and non-crisis periods for more and less ﬁnancially developed economies. There is evidence that the
most recent ﬁnancial crisis adversely inﬂuenced equity markets in the world: countries with poor credit market regulations
12 The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available.
13 In the robustness tests section we present results when we  employ the ratio of total value of stock traded to gross domestic product as an alternative
sorting  device for ﬁnancial development. In addition, we  found that our results are upheld when other measures are used such as the mean of stock market
capitalisation and outstanding domestic private debt securities to gross domestic product (GDP).
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nd larger pre-crisis current account deﬁcits were hit the hardest (Giannone et al., 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011).
he estimated model is described as follows:
EHBit = a0 + a1Eduit ∗ Fin.Devit ∗ Crisist + a2Eduit ∗ (1 − Fin.Devit) ∗ Crisist + a3Eduit ∗ Fin.Devit ∗ (1 − Crisist)
+ a4Eduit ∗ (1 − Fin.Devit) ∗ (1 − Crisist) + a5Fin.Devit + a6Xit + eit, (4)
If the interaction terms during the crisis are signiﬁcantly different from the same terms outside of the crisis, then the
dditional response of the home bias to education during the crisis is detectable compared to tranquil periods.
. Data and summary statistics
.1. Data
The data for this paper are drawn from different sources including the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS),
he World Development Indicator (hereafter WDI) of the World Bank, the IMD  World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY),
he World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the DataStream. These are combined in a new way  to demonstrate the
ffect of education on international diversiﬁcation in equity portfolios. The data-set covers 38 countries over the period of
001–2010.14
.1.1. Home bias measure
Portfolio holdings data for constructing the equity home bias measure are taken from Coordinated Portfolio Investment
urvey (CPIS) held by the IMF. This survey contains comparable multi-country data at the security level from end-investors,
ustodians and a combination of the above. Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument (equity) and residence of
ssuer.15 The equity market capitalisation data are from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE).
.1.2. Education
In our study, we measure education using traditional indicators such as tertiary school enrolment rates, mathematical
iteracy and ﬁnancial skills. Tertiary enrolment rates are drawn from the WDI  of the World Bank. As an alternative measure
f education we employ the PISA maths scores for 15 year old individuals. This is a good proxy for economic literacy as
t provides an assessment of ﬁnancial knowledge and skills (Jappelli, 2010). This variable can also be a good measure to
apture the numerical ability as the propensity to invest is related with numerical ability, verbal ﬂuency and recall skills
Christelis et al., 2010). Finally, this variable allows us to capture ﬁnancial literacy among young people, which has been
ighlighted as an important factor at the beginning of individuals’ working life (see Jappelli, 2010; Lusardi and Micthell,
014). In addition to these variables, we use an indicator of ﬁnancial skills drawn from the IMD  World Competiveness
earbook (WCY). This indicator is based on a survey conducted on senior business managers who  represent a cross-section
f the business community in the countries examined. The survey tries to answer questions related to efﬁciency and ability
f managers to adapt towards changing enterprise competitiveness. WCY  also reports questions related to value added
ctivities in business, since skilled labour force is able to enhance a country’s competitiveness. The distribution and ranking
f economies in the survey carried out by WCY  is very similar to those provided by the Survey of Health, Assets, Retirement
nd Expectations (SHARE), which gives information on the cognitive ability at the individual level in 11 European countries
see Jappelli, 2010; Jappelli and Padula, 2013). Thus, WCY  can provide a representative base for conducting our empirical
nalysis.
.1.3. Other inﬂuences
Data on GDP growth, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and labour force size are taken from the WDI  of the World
ank. Turnover ratio, domestic credit and stock market capitalisation data are also sourced from the WDI  of the World Bank.
inally, data on leverage and current ratio are obtained from the DataStream Global Index. DataStream, which is distributed by
homson Reuters, is a global ﬁnancial and macroeconomic database for equities, stock market indices, currencies, company
undamentals and ﬁxed income securities.
14 Due to missing information in the CPIS dataset for India and Mexico, the home bias data for these countries begin in 2003. We have selected a data-set
hich  is comparable to De Moor and Vanpée (2013) with the exception of Canada, Germany, Singapore and South Africa that suffer from missing data on
he  education variables. In line with the literature, we do not remove outliers from the chosen variables, but in unreported regressions we ﬁnd that even
fter  dropping outliers from the equity home bias term and the regression variables, our results remain unchanged. These results are not reported but are
vailable from the authors upon request.
15 The CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings and has been employed by a number of recent studies
e.g.  Fidora et al., 2007; Bekaert and Wang, 2009; Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010). However, it is still subject to a number of important caveats such as incom-
lete  country coverage (see De Moor and Vanpée, 2013). For general information about the database see http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#ﬁnancial.
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Table 1
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Fin.Dev (1 − Fin.Dev) p-value
Average equity home bias (%) 77.12
(21.10)
68.70
(18.44)
82.13
(21.03)
0.000
Tertiary education 55.38
(20.96)
60.87
(16.55)
52.05
(22.63)
0.000
PISA 480.34
(51.25)
506.55
(34.60)
464.17
(52.81)
0.000
Financial skills 65.51
(10.35)
71.82
(7.85)
61.67
(9.80)
0.000
GDP growth 2.91
(3.43)
2.37
(2.71)
3.22
(3.76)
0.011
FDI 3.96
(6.18)
4.97
(6.09)
3.37
(6.17)
0.014
Trade 82.30
(60.43)
96.62
(86.36)
73.94
(35.55)
0.004
Labour force size 36.90
(76.02)
25.47
(39.42)
43.57
(90.22)
0.007
English legal origin 0.24
(0.43)
0.43
(0.50)
0.13
(0.33)
0.000
Financial openness 1.42
(1.31)
2.12
(0.74)
1.01
(1.40)
0.000
Turnover ratio 82.18
(61.27)
106.50
(62.60)
67.82
(55.81)
0.000
Domestic credit 107.43
(62.80)
151.10
(64.01)
81.72
(45.58)
0.000
Market capitalisation 77.65
(75.35)
135.03
(95.08)
43.91
(25.30)
0.000
Current ratio 4.23
(16.73)
4.12
(15.41)
4.30
(17.53)
0.919
Leverage 36.43
(8.64)
35.55
(8.20)
36.96
(8.88)
0.122
Euro 0.24
(0.46)
0.29
(0.45)
0.21
(0.41)
0.097
No. of observations 375 140 235Note: The table presents sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. The p-value of a test of equality of means with unequal variances is
reported. Fin.Dev is a dummy  which takes the value one if a country’s stock market capitalisation is higher than the average, and zero otherwise.
4.2. Summary statistics
By way of preliminary analysis we present descriptive statistics for equity home bias and the country-speciﬁc variables
used in the regression models in Table 1. We  report these values for the whole sample (column 1); for more and less ﬁnancially
developed economies (columns 2 and 3); and a p-value for the test of equality of means with unequal variances (column 4).
To begin with the average home bias for the whole sample takes the value 77.12% for equity portfolios. The statistics also
show that in all countries equity portfolios exhibit home bias, with the highest average equity home bias observed in Turkey
during the period of 2001–2010 and the lowest average equity home bias occurs in the United States.16
Further, in columns 2 and 3 we ﬁnd that home bias is more prevalent in less ﬁnancially developed economies. We  show
that the average equity home bias in the more ﬁnancially developed economies is 68.70%, while that for the less developed
economies is 82.13%. Put differently, investors in the less ﬁnancially developed economies hold less than 1/5th of foreign
equities that they should be holding according to the basic international CAPM model. This supports the notion put forward
by Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) that home bias in equities is likely to be more important in economies with less developed
ﬁnancial markets.17 In addition, Sercu and Vanpée (2007) point out that emerging market economies have more volatile
stock markets and hence display higher equity home bias. They argue that international investors are reluctant to invest in
these economies due to higher risk and volatility.We observe that all measures of education are signiﬁcantly higher for the developed group, as expected. Variables
reﬂecting macro-economic conditions such as GDP growth and FDI display signiﬁcantly different values for the two  groups
of countries.18 Speciﬁcally, less ﬁnancially developed economies are growing faster compared to their more developed
16 See Table A.2 in appendix for statistics on the home bias across the countries employed in this paper.
17 Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) show that emerging markets have less diversiﬁcation in their equity portfolios than developed economies and do not
display  any downward trend in home bias.
18 Table A.2 also provides the average of different measures of education for 2001–2010 across countries.
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ounterparts, while the level of FDI is higher for the more developed group as opposed to the less developed group. With
espect to information-related variables, we observe that trade, labour force size and the English legal origin dummy  have
igniﬁcant differences across the two groups of countries. More ﬁnancially developed countries have a higher level of trade
nd most have English as their legal origin compared to less developed economies. We  also observe that labour force
ize is larger for more ﬁnancially developed countries compared to less developed countries. This statistic is mainly inﬂu-
nced by India which has the largest labour force amongst the less developed countries. Financial openness is signiﬁcantly
igher for economies with more ﬁnancially developed markets as opposed to less developed economies. Moving to ﬁnan-
ial market indicators, we ﬁnd that turnover ratio, domestic credit and market capitalisation are larger for the developed
ountries and are also signiﬁcantly different from the less developed group. In addition, while less developed economies
isplay higher current ratios and levels of debts, the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the mean of the
uro dummy  is higher for more ﬁnancially developed economies and also signiﬁcantly different from the less developed
roup.
Taken together, two points can be highlighted from these preliminary statistics. First, equity portfolios are signiﬁcantly
ome-biased in our sample. Second, more ﬁnancially developed economies enjoy an advantageous position in attracting
oreign investments, display higher levels of education, stronger economic and ﬁnancial factors, ﬁnancial market liberalisa-
ion and lower exchange rate risk than less ﬁnancially developed economies. It remains to be seen, though, whether these
reliminary ﬁndings continue to hold when we control for a number of factors which are known to play a role in international
iversiﬁcation studies. In the sections that follow we  test within a formal regression analysis framework whether education
as a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on equity home bias.
. Results
.1. Education and home bias in equity portfolios
In this section we shed light on the role played by education in equity portfolios. We report parameter estimates obtained
rom OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions.19
IV methods rely on two assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the excluded instruments are distributed independently of the
rror process, and the second, that they are sufﬁciently correlated with the included endogenous regressors. We  propose
hat primary education enrolment rates and unemployment rates (percentage of total labour force) can provide plausible
xogenous source of variations in the level of education.20 In addition, both instruments are expected to affect education and
umeracy but they do not impact the degree of diversiﬁcation directly. We  also assume that all the other control variables
sed in the model are possibly endogenous. Thus, we  instrument for these variables using their own  values lagged twice.
ags of the variables are legitimate candidates since they contain information about the current values of the potentially
ndogenous variables and remain uncorrelated with the current value of the measurement error (see Almeida et al., 2010).21
e  check the relevance and validity of the instruments used for education as well as for our control variables employing a
umber of diagnostics. p-values for these tests are reported at the foot of the tables.
We report OLS estimates of equity home bias for different measures of education in columns 1–3 and IV estimates in
olumns 4–6 of Table 2.22 We  begin with tertiary education in column 1 and then add PISA math scores and ﬁnancial skills
n subsequent columns. The point estimates on education suggest a robust relationship between the different measures of
ducation and the home bias for equity portfolios. Education attracts a negative and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for all the
hree measures, which enables us to assess the impact of a ceteris paribus increase in education on the degree of equity home
ias. Our ﬁnding suggests that increasing the percentage of university graduates or the level of mathematical numeracy is
ikely to reduce the level of home bias. This ﬁnding is not only statistically but also economically important. To ascertain
ts magnitude, we calculate percentage point effects by dividing the coefﬁcient value (marginal effect) with the predicted
robability of the model. Therefore, a 10% increase in tertiary education graduates leads to a 3.39% reduction in home bias.23
24n identical increase in PISA scores and ﬁnancial skills will drop equity home bias by 1.24% and 7.22%, respectively. The IV
esults show similar magnitudes for tertiary education and PISA scores. A 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores
educes home bias by 6.09% and 2.57%, respectively. On the other hand, ﬁnancial skills do not exert a signiﬁcant impact on
quity home bias indicating that the previous ﬁnding might be subject to endogeneity bias not controlled for in the OLS
19 We show the ﬁrst stage IV estimates and statistics in Table A.3.
20 We present scatter plots with best-ﬁtting regression lines in Fig. A.1 to document the strong relationship between equity home bias and tertiary
ducation, mathematical numeracy and ﬁnancial skills. On the other hand, the scatter plot shows a weak relationship between equity home bias and
rimary education with a very low correlation coefﬁcient (0.13).
21 Following the bulk of the literature on ﬁrm-level behaviour, we  instrument ﬁnancial variables such as turnover ratio, trade, market capitalisation,
urrent ratio, domestic credit and leverage using their own values lagged two times.
22 Results obtained by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method are quantitatively similar to the OLS results implying that the error terms are
ncorrelated.
23 As noted above, these percentage effects are calculated based on the ratio of the coefﬁcient to the predicted probability of the model. More speciﬁcally,
n  column 1 the point estimate of -0.260 is divided by the predicted probability of 76.81 and then multiplied by 10.
24 Note that the effect of ﬁnancial skills is of a bigger magnitude compared to PISA scores.
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Table 2
Baseline model for the equity home bias.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS  OLS OLS IV IV IV
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Education −0.260** −0.091** −0.554** −0.470** −0.186* 0.340
(−2.45) (−2.05) (−2.63) (−2.22) (−1.79) (0.92)
GDP  growth 0.562* 0.085 0.586 −0.642 −0.283 −0.287
(1.72) (0.34) (1.38) (−1.49) (−0.99) (−1.04)
FDI  −0.288 −0.145 −0.172 −0.232 −0.231 0.001
(−1.22) (−0.90) (−1.24) (−0.84) (−1.11) (0.00)
Trade  −0.015 −0.033 −0.023 −0.164 −0.056 0.050
(−0.38) (−0.42) (−0.35) (−1.59) (−0.46) (0.59)
Labour force size −0.021 −0.033 −0.007 −0.135*** −0.197*** −0.137
(−0.92) (−0.49) (−0.14) (−2.60) (−2.77) (−1.34)
English legal origin −11.277** 1.499 −2.396 1.281 24.135 8.562
(−2.08) (0.34) (−0.52) (0.13) (1.52) (0.61)
Financial openness −4.341** −7.420** −8.477*** 0.966 6.390 −3.971
(−2.46) (−2.68) (−4.34) (0.35) (1.28) (−1.62)
Turnover ratio 0.004 0.017 −0.009 0.068 0.008 −0.001
(0.13) (0.53) (−0.37) (1.59) (0.23) (−0.05)
Domestic credit −0.089** −0.154*** −0.122** −0.211*** −0.194*** −0.207***
(−2.11) (−2.96) (−2.39) (−3.98) (−4.01) (−4.61)
Market capitalisation 0.037 0.021 0.020 0.092 −0.005 −0.052
(0.93) (0.68) (0.80) (1.55) (−0.08) (−0.84)
Fin.Dev 4.946 2.899 7.497 −7.241 −8.919 5.120
(0.81) (0.40) (1.08) (−0.60) (−0.56) (0.36)
Current ratio −0.038 −0.056** −0.033 −0.221 −0.200* −0.094
(−1.54) (−2.24) (−0.91) (−1.39) (−1.80) (−0.94)
Leverage −0.015 0.213 0.268 −0.044 −0.076 0.048
(−0.07) (0.69) (1.07) (−0.26) (−0.30) (0.23)
Euro  −16.704** −3.842 −6.705 −16.147*** −15.952*** −29.129***
(−2.40) (−0.47) (−1.04) (−3.39) (−4.61) (−2.97)
Constant 112.797*** 136.313*** 126.294*** 133.848*** 181.252*** 78.735***
(11.36) (5.64) (8.24) (15.43) (4.49) (3.77)
Predicted probability 76.81 73.24 76.78 77.12 72.47 76.30
N  345 244 349 320 222 316
R2 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.91
Kleibergen–Paap – – – 0.031 0.060 0.032
Anderson–Rubin – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock–Wright – – – 0.000 0.004 0.000
Hansen J – – – 0.551 0.621 0.854
Note: Columns 1–3 report OLS regression results, while columns 4–6 report IV (2SLS) regression results. Robust t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (IV) are
reported in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Time dummies and country dummies are included in the
speciﬁcations. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. In the IV regressions the main measures of education are instrumented
using  the percentage of individuals with primary education and unemployment rates, while the other control variables are instrumented using their lagged
levels  at t − 2. The Kleibergen–Paap is a test of under-identiﬁcation, distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identiﬁcation. The Anderson–Rubin
and  Stock–Wright LM S statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference tests, which are distributed as F-test and chi-square respectively, under the null
that  coefﬁcients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Hansen J
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.
estimates. Overall, these results which highlight the effect of education on equity home bias are in line with Cole et al. (2012)
and Graham et al. (2009), who show that ﬁnancial market participation increases if the education attained at the school level
improves. Importantly, our results also conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Karlsson and Nordén (2007) that higher levels of education
are associated with lower equity home bias.
Next, we focus on the country-speciﬁc control variables used in the models.25 We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on GDP
growth and FDI are statistically insigniﬁcant with some marginal evidence that fast growing countries display a higher level
of equity home bias. With respect to information-related variables, we ﬁnd that trade enters with a negative but insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient in the equity home bias regression. Both labour force size and the English legal origin dummy, when signiﬁcant,
enter with the expected negative coefﬁcients. The former ﬁnding implies that greater participation in labour force is likely to
have a positive impact on foreign portfolio diversiﬁcation. The latter ﬁnding shows that countries that have English common
law as their legal origin display lower levels of home bias as the investor and shareholder protection aspect of the legal origin
helps in ﬁnancial market development (La Porta et al., 2008).
25 Table A.4 provides the correlation matrix between all the explanatory variables which show that our variables do not suffer from high correlation.
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Financial openness enters with the anticipated negative sign and is highly signiﬁcant in all models estimated via OLS. This
esult shows that an increase in a country’s ﬁnancial openness is likely to reduce the equity home bias. This ﬁnding is in
ine with Bekaert and Wang (2009) and Mondria and Wu (2013). While, turnover ratio is insigniﬁcant, we  observe a negative
nd highly statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for domestic credit which is a measure of ﬁnancial depth. This suggests that an
mprovement in a country’s liquidity and expansion of ﬁnancial markets helps to attract more foreign investment, resulting
n a negative relation with equity home bias.
Current ratio attains the expected negative sign, while leverage is quantitatively unimportant. Firms with a higher current
atio are in better ﬁnancial shape and can attract more foreign investments (Edison and Warnock, 2004). Thus, an increase
n foreign investments tends to reduce equity home bias. The coefﬁcient on the Euro dummy is consistently negative and
ighly signiﬁcant. The point estimates indicate that countries within the Euro-area have lower home bias in equity portfolios
s shown by De Moor and Vanpée (2013). This result implies that countries with a common currency such as the Eurozone
ountries experience lower home bias in terms of equities (Baele et al., 2007). Lastly, both the ﬁnancial development dummy
nd stock market capitalisation are generally insigniﬁcant. Regarding the IV diagnostics, the Kleibergen–Paap statistics reject
he null hypothesis that the equation is underidentiﬁed. The Anderson–Rubin and Stock–Wright statistics, which are the
eak instrument-robust inference tests, do not reject the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the excluded instruments
re jointly equal to zero. Finally, the Hansen J statistic of the overidentifying restriction also shows that the instruments are
alid.26
.2. Accounting for different levels of ﬁnancial development
Having identiﬁed a direct relationship between education and home bias, we now explore whether this link varies for
ountries with different levels of ﬁnancial market development. Table 3 presents estimates for the interaction terms between
ducation and Fin.Dev and (1 − Fin.Dev) dummies. The results reveal the heterogeneity between countries that is masked in
he estimates for the full sample.
We report parameter estimates in Table 3. The coefﬁcients associated with the interaction terms are negative and signiﬁ-
ant for the less ﬁnancially developed countries, while they are quantitatively unimportant for their developed counterparts.
n other words, we ﬁnd that improving education is likely to decrease the level of home bias for less ﬁnancially developed
conomies. The magnitude of the interacted coefﬁcients suggests an economically meaningful result. Speciﬁcally, a 10%
ncrease in tertiary education and PISA scores will reduce home bias in less developed economies by 6.39% and 1.99%, respec-
ively. The IV results show that a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will reduce home bias in less developed
conomies by 5.52% and 3.97%, respectively.27
To put it differently, we ﬁnd that countries which are characterised by less developed ﬁnancial markets exhibit a higher
ensitivity of equity home bias to education. Tests of equality for the education coefﬁcients between the two groups of
ountries indicate that the null hypothesis of equality can be rejected in all regression models. This is a novel ﬁnding which
ighlights that education has a differentiated effect in determining equity home bias in economies with less developed
nancial sector. Hence, it suggests that an increase in the percentage of University graduates and an improvement in math-
matical numeracy in economies that display a lower level of equity market development can be a crucial factor in reducing
quity home bias. Speciﬁcally, an increase in the level of education helps in strengthening the investor’s competence that, in
urn, encourages the investor to diversify his/her portfolio in terms of foreign investments. Lastly, with respect to the other
ontrol variables in the model, they retain their signiﬁcance in most cases and behave as conjectured.
.3. The effect of the most recent ﬁnancial crisis
Our sample spans the most recent global ﬁnancial crisis and as such it provides an interesting set-up to explore the impact
f the crisis on portfolio diversiﬁcation. We  address the response to the crisis by examining the sensitivity of home bias to
ducation in the 2007–2010 ﬁnancial crisis. We  report coefﬁcients on variables interacted with the dummy  variables Crisis
nd (1 − Crisis) along with the dummies (Fin.Dev) and (1 − Fin.Dev).
The results reported in Table 4 show the impact of the equity home bias in more and less ﬁnancially developed economies
uring crisis and non-crisis periods. To begin with, the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms are negative and signiﬁcant for
ess ﬁnancially developed economies in both crisis and non-crisis periods. The results imply that education plays a more
mportant role in reducing the equity home bias in economies with lower levels of equity market development during the
risis and non-crisis periods compared to more ﬁnancially advanced economies.
In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the coefﬁcient values imply important differences. In particular, during the crisis
eriod, a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will lead to a reduction in the equity home bias of less ﬁnancially
26 In addition to the statistics reported at the tables of results, we  also employed the Anderson Rubin chi-square test and obtained identical p-values with
he  Anderson Rubin F-test.
27 The estimated coefﬁcients on ﬁnancial skills do not show any statistically signiﬁcant impact on equity home bias when we split our countries on the
asis  of their ﬁnancial development. One potential explanation for this ﬁnding might be the fact that ﬁnancial skills are widespread across both developed
nd  developing economies and we  are unable to detect any heterogeneity.
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Table 3
Accounting for different levels of ﬁnancial development.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS  OLS OLS IV IV IV
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Edu ∗ (Fin.Dev) 0.164 −0.002 −0.054 0.297 −0.006 0.664
(1.23) (−0.04) (−0.27) (1.11) (−0.07) (1.06)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.491*** −0.146*** −0.135 −0.424** −0.287* −0.612
(−4.96) (−2.99) (−0.89) (−2.15) (−1.81) (−1.62)
GDP  growth 0.073 −0.049 0.063 0.803 −0.291 −0.115
(0.46) (−0.22) (0.41) (1.16) (−0.68) (−0.38)
FDI  −0.095 −0.070 −0.115 0.062 0.180 0.160
(−1.03) (−0.81) (−1.09) (0.41) (1.51) (1.10)
Trade  0.002 0.010 0.025 −0.105 −0.161** −0.184***
(0.03) (0.18) (0.45) (−0.76) (−2.01) (−2.79)
Labour force size −0.116*** −0.088* −0.024 −0.121** −0.455 0.061
(−3.23) (−1.81) (−0.45) (−2.20) (−1.10) (0.17)
English legal origin 7.587 10.640** 4.530 −4.797 8.373 −0.910
(1.67) (2.31) (1.13) (−0.76) (1.35) (−0.14)
Financial openness −2.187 −0.762 −5.434*** 3.629 0.014 1.340
(−1.23) (−0.34) (−3.88) (1.41) (0.50) (0.51)
Turnover ratio −0.017 0.021 −0.004 −0.019 −0.153** 0.022
(−1.28) (1.01) (−0.22) (−0.92) (−2.46) (1.16)
Domestic credit −0.151*** −0.191*** −0.185*** −0.185*** −142.671** −0.138**
(−4.78) (−5.92) (−6.60) (−3.84) (−2.02) (−2.48)
Market capitalisation 0.021 0.019 0.009 0.052 0.006 −0.002
(0.67) (0.79) (0.33) (1.62) (0.23) (−0.03)
Fin.Dev −44.986*** −78.045** −6.863 −47.950** −0.013 −96.912*
(−2.81) (−2.69) (−0.47) (−2.26) (−0.51) (−1.74)
Current ratio −0.047** −0.053*** −0.047* 0.007 0.082 −0.030
(−2.61) (−3.13) (−1.85) (0.15) (0.26) (−1.33)
Leverage 0.063 0.240 0.181 −0.004 −15.134 0.197
(0.41) (0.82) (0.93) (−0.03) (−1.58) (1.36)
Euro  −23.910*** −21.157*** −20.057*** −30.889*** 13.635 −12.480***
(−5.53) (−5.33) (−5.44) (−2.91) (1.04) (−4.10)
Constant 123.960*** 157.847*** 105.284*** 121.926*** 229.238*** 137.907***
(13.65) (6.80) (8.13) (12.15) (3.56) (5.73)
Predicted probability 76.89 73.24 76.83 76.85 72.21 77.02
N  345 244 349 321 230 315
R2 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.904 0.87
Test  of equality (p. value): Edu 0.002 0.020 0.682 0.043 0.062 0.095
Kleibergen–Paap – – – 0.095 0.011 0.075
Anderson–Rubin – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock–Wright – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J – – – 0.348 0.163 0.118
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The p-value refers to the test of equality between Edu ∗ Fin.Dev and Edu ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev).
Also,  see notes to Table 2.developed economies by 6.36% and 3.09%, respectively. In tranquil periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and
PISA scores will drop the equity home bias in less developed economies by 6.32% and 2.66%, respectively. The IV estimates
show similar magnitudes. During the crisis period, a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will lead to a reduction
in the equity home bias of less ﬁnancially developed economies by 6.88% and 3.78%, respectively. In non-crisis periods, an
identical increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will drop the equity home bias in less developed economies by 6.47%
and 3.31%, respectively. The test of equality of the coefﬁcients, which is reported at the foot of the table, shows a statistically
signiﬁcant difference between the above-mentioned coefﬁcients.
In summary, the greater sensitivities of equity home bias to changes in the level of education are documented for
economies which exhibit lower levels of ﬁnancial development during the crisis than outside. According to Eichengreen
et al. (2006), during adverse economic events foreign investors tend to escape emerging markets because these are char-
acterised by lower liquidity, higher volatility and domestic risk. This ﬁnding was  also noted in Mizen and Tsoukas (2012),
who documented a substantial increase in the bond market external ﬁnance premium for the emerging Asian markets. This
results in lower levels of foreign investments and higher degree of home bias in emerging markets. Thus, our ﬁnding suggests
that having more university graduates, or a higher level of mathematical numeracy, reduces the extent of local equity home
bias during the crisis, especially in less developed economies. This could be one important factor in ameliorating the adverse
effects of ﬁnancial crises with respect to international diversiﬁcation.
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Table  4
The role of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev 0.162 −0.015 −0.004 0.004 0.010 0.940
(1.20) (−0.17) (−0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (1.33)
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.489*** −0.226** −0.198 −0.530*** −0.276*** −0.702
(−4.87) (−2.36) (−1.19) (−3.11) (−2.83) (−1.57)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev 0.156 0.003 −0.002 0.022 0.028 0.873
(1.03) (0.04) (−0.01) (0.09) (0.24) (1.25)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.486*** −0.195** −0.154 −0.498** −0.242*** −0.608
(−4.50) (−2.22) (−0.99) (−2.31) (−2.65) (−1.44)
GDP  growth 0.073 −0.043 0.052 0.162 0.026 −0.094
(0.44) (−0.24) (0.34) (0.77) (0.11) (−0.28)
FDI  −0.096 −0.091 −0.115 0.173 0.033 0.157
(−1.06) (−0.78) (−1.12) (1.53) (0.28) (1.15)
Trade  0.001 −0.059 0.018 −0.303*** −0.066 −0.191***
(0.02) (−1.02) (0.32) (−4.20) (−1.24) (−3.06)
Labour force size −0.115*** −0.114* −0.027 −0.287*** −0.203** −0.009
(−3.13) (−1.81) (−0.51) (−2.97) (−2.22) (−0.02)
English legal origin 7.709 6.333 4.713 −7.176 −7.016 −0.143
(1.66) (0.82) (1.15) (−1.21) (−0.51) (−0.02)
Financial openness −2.167 3.074 −5.324*** 4.783** 6.503** 1.816
(−1.20) (0.82) (−3.71) (2.14) (2.10) (0.69)
Turnover ratio −0.017 0.007 −0.004 0.004 0.003 0.015
(−1.27) (0.22) (−0.26) (0.14) (0.09) (0.64)
Domestic credit −0.153*** −0.187*** −0.181*** −0.103** −0.138*** −0.164**
(−5.10) (−4.49) (−6.61) (−2.13) (−2.82) (−2.54)
Market capitalisation 0.022 0.065 0.011 0.053 0.057 −0.010
(0.70) (1.37) (0.38) (1.53) (1.25) (−0.13)
Fin.Dev −44.490*** −108.207** −13.825 −38.460** −136.078** −115.796*
(−2.73) (−2.20) (−0.90) (−2.24) (−2.45) (−1.90)
Current ratio −0.047** −0.039** −0.044* −0.016 −0.034 −0.012
(−2.55) (−2.68) (−1.92) (−0.53) (−1.49) (−0.52)
Leverage 0.063 0.082 0.156 −0.213 0.378 0.122
(0.37) (0.34) (0.76) (−0.90) (1.46) (0.69)
Euro  −23.805*** −14.827** −19.623*** −23.810*** −27.476*** −11.273***
(−5.62) (−2.39) (−5.05) (−2.85) (−2.98) (−3.56)
Constant 123.881*** 198.252*** 109.061*** 143.080*** 203.834*** 146.172***
(13.62) (4.61) (7.69) (10.84) (5.07) (5.60)
Predicted probability 76.89 73.24 76.85 76.99 73.01 76.97
N  345 244 349 300 225 316
R2 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.87
Test  of equality (p value):
Edu ∗ Crisis 0.003 0.048 0.344 0.027 0.013 0.045
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) 0.005 0.059 0.433 0.051 0.018 0.065
Edu  ∗ Fin.Dev 0.899 0.488 0.953 0.717 0.807 0.343
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) 0.953 0.246 0.381 0.614 0.668 0.205
Kleibergen–Paap – – – 0.021 0.018 0.078
Anderson–Rubin – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock–Wright – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J – – – 0.354 0.130 0.224
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). With reference to the test of equality, Edu ∗ Crisis gives the test of equality between
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev and Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev), Edu ∗ (1 − Crisis) for Edu ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev and Edu ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev), Edu ∗ Fin.Dev for
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev and Edu ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev. Finally, Edu ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) refers to the test of equality between Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) and
E
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adu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev). Also, see notes to Table 2.
. Robustness tests
.1. Alternative estimation methods
Given the panel dimension of our data-set, and to ensure that our results do not suffer from unobserved country-
peciﬁc heterogeneity, we employ both random and ﬁxed effects models. The estimates obtained from random and ﬁxed
ffects are reported in columns 1–3 and 4–5 respectively of Table 5. It is apparent that our main results are upheld.
nder the classical assumptions, the random effects estimator is consistent and efﬁcient if all the explanatory variables
re uncorrelated with the individual effects. The estimates of the random effects model represent the average effect of
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Table 5
Robustness: random-effects and ﬁxed-effects regressions.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE  RE RE FE FE FE
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Panel 1
Education −0.271*** −0.075** −0.567*** −0.155** −0.124* 0.098
(−3.67) (−2.13) (−3.02) (−2.34) (−1.95) (1.44)
Predicted probability 76.89 73.24 76.85 78.83 73.24 78.60
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.31 0.26 0.16 0.38 0.36 0.38
Panel  2
Edu ∗ (Fin.Dev) 0.093 −0.008 −0.092 −0.009 −0.165 −0.006
(0.84) (−0.18) (−0.43) (−0.10) (−1.08) (−0.05)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.429*** −0.145*** −0.084 −0.232*** −0.114 0.150*
(−6.39) (−3.02) (−0.65) (−3.08) (−1.57) (1.83)
Predicted probability 76.90 73.24 76.83 78.70 73.24 78.69
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.38
Test  of equality (p value): Edu 0.000 0.010 0.973 0.038 0.770 0.255
Panel  3
Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev 0.087 −0.003 −0.017 −0.024 0.104 −0.037
(0.87) (−0.06) (−0.09) (−0.23) (0.74) (−0.31)
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.425*** −0.173*** −0.211 −0.228*** −0.170** 0.057
(−6.40) (−3.19) (−1.46) (−2.96) (−2.26) (0.67)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev 0.081 0.034 −0.004 −0.009 0.124 −0.019
(0.82) (0.63) (−0.02) (−0.08) (0.88) (−0.17)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.403*** −0.122** −0.131 −0.168** −0.137* 0.126
(−4.77) (−2.47) (−1.00) (−2.05) (−1.97) (1.53)
Predicted probability 76.90 73.24 76.86 78.63 73.24 79.13
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.39
Test  of equality (p value):
Edu ∗ Crisis 0.000 0.004 0.396 0.087 0.088 0.517
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) 0.000 0.007 0.555 0.223 0.105 0.302
Edu  ∗ Fin.Dev 0.887 0.053 0.743 0.462 0.261 0.327
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) 0.629 0.013 0.135 0.002 0.064 0.000
Note: The Table reports random-effects regression results in columns 1–3 and ﬁxed-effects regression results in columns 4–6. The remaining speciﬁcations,
which  are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2–4. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to
Table 2.
education over equity home bias when education changes across time and between countries. More speciﬁcally, it shows a
reduction in equity home bias by 3.51% and 1.02% when tertiary education and mathematical numeracy increase by 10%
respectively, across time and between countries. On splitting the countries on the basis of ﬁnancial development, the
estimates show that a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores reduces home bias by 5.58% and 1.98%, respec-
tively, in the less developed countries. Finally, the estimates during the crisis period show that a 10% increase in tertiary
education and PISA scores in less developed countries leads to a reduction in the equity home bias by 5.53% and 2.36%
respectively, across time and between countries. In tranquil periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and PISA
scores in less developed countries will drop the equity home bias by 5.24% and 1.67% respectively, across time and between
countries.
The ﬁxed-effects model is aimed at examining the robustness of our ﬁndings within countries. We  ﬁnd that for a given
country, as tertiary education and mathematical numeracy increase by 10% across time, equity home bias drops by 1.97%
and 1.69%, respectively. Further, we observe that a 10% increase in tertiary education reduces home bias in less developed
countries by 2.95%. Finally, the estimates during the crisis period show a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores
leads to a reduction in the equity home bias across less developed countries by 2.90% and 2.32% respectively. In tranquil
periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will drop the equity home bias in less developed countries
by 2.14% and 1.87%, respectively.28 Taking these results into consideration, we  can conclude that employing both random and
ﬁxed effects methods does not make a substantial difference, suggesting that our results are robust to alternative estimation
techniques.
28 The estimates of both random and ﬁxed effects models show that the impact of ﬁnancial skills on equity home bias remains largely insigniﬁcant.
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Table  6
Robustness: using alternative measures of equity home bias and ﬁnancial development.
Main measure Dependent variable = Scaled equity home bias Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Panel 1
Education −0.205*** −0.164** −0.594** −0.328*** −0.221** −0.647**
(−2.92) (−2.23) (−2.28) (−3.73) (−2.17) (−2.43)
Fin.Dev2 – – – 9.502* 1.646 −3.274
–  – – (2.02) (0.19) (−0.55)
Predicted probability 78.59 75.08 78.59 76.88 73.24 76.87
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.84 0.85
Panel:  2
Edu ∗ (Fin.Dev) 0.169 −0.014 0.095 – – –
(1.26) (−0.17) (0.50) – – –
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.411*** −0.258** −0.019 – – –
(−4.54) (−2.44) (−0.16) – – –
Edu  ∗ (Fin.Dev2) – – – 0.004 0.208 −0.957**
–  – – (0.02) (1.34) (−2.19)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev2) – – – −0.445*** −0.340*** −0.414*
–  – – (−4.21) (−4.25) (−1.86)
Predicted probability 78.60 75.08 78.59 76.95 73.24 76.86
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.85
Test  of equality (p value): Edu 0.004 0.027 0.554 0.051 0.005 0.239
Panel:  3
Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev 0.171 −0.001 0.105 – – –
(1.27) (−0.01) (0.57) – – –
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.428*** −0.265** −0.104 – – –
(−4.67) (−2.41) (−0.74) – – –
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev 0.211 −0.000 0.132 – – –
(1.47) (−0.01) (0.72) – – –
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.396*** −0.253** −0.044 – – –
(−3.97) (−2.31) (−0.35) – – –
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev2 – – – −0.021 0.216 −0.932**
–  – – (−0.11) (1.25) (−2.04)
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev2) – – – −0.465*** −0.420*** −0.487**
–  – – (−4.42) (−4.62) (−2.10)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev2 – – – −0.003 0.298* −0.900**
–  – – (−0.02) (1.80) (−2.03)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev2) – – – −0.420*** −0.320*** −0.424*
–  – – (−3.85) (−4.01) (−1.91)
Predicted probability 78.60 75.08 78.60 76.94 73.24 76.88
N  345 244 349 345 244 349
R2 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.85
Test  of equality (p value):
Edu ∗ Crisis 0.004 0.023 0.316 0.051 0.003 0.355
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) 0.004 0.026 0.364 0.072 0.004 0.313
Edu  ∗ Fin.Dev 0.258 0.938 0.376 0.561 0.002 0.374
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) 0.468 0.043 0.221 0.127 0.001 0.007
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mote: The Table reports OLS regression results for scaled equity home bias in columns 1–3 and equity home bias in columns 4–6. The remaining speciﬁcations,
hich are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2–4. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to
able 2.
.2. An alternative measure of home bias and ﬁnancial development
Next, we modify the measure of equity home bias in the spirit of Bekaert and Wang (2009). The authors argue that there
s a size bias in the previous measure of home bias shown in Eq. (2) and hence large markets might display lower levels of
ome bias. To solve this potential problem of size bias, Bekaert and Wang (2009) scale the home bias measure in Eq. (2) by
he maximum home bias:
HB = HBitit (1 − (Mit/W))
here HBit is the home bias measure in Eq. (2), Mit is the market capitalisation of country i for time period t, W is the world
arket capitalisation.
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Table 7
Robustness: Tobit models.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Panel 1
Education −0.405*** −0.167** −0.729*** −0.308*** −0.196** −0.884***
(−3.32) (−2.06) (−3.21) (−2.60) (−2.37) (−3.11)
Predicted probability 88.33 78.02 85.17 90.84 88.32 96.61
Uncensored Observations 211 170 216 163 133 165
Left  Censored Observations 0 0 0 1 1 1
Right  Censored Observations 134 74 133 181 110 183
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.30
Panel  2
Edu ∗ (Fin.Dev) 0.061 −0.016 −0.085 0.040 −0.018 −0.032
(0.42) (−0.32) (−0.46) (0.39) (−0.87) (−0.18)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.559*** −0.181** −0.058 −0.480*** −0.363* 0.020
(−3.68) (−2.15) (−0.33) (−2.93) (−1.69) (0.14)
Predicted probability 85.91 78.17 85.76 86.99 86.89 88.88
Uncensored Observations 211 170 216 163 133 165
Left  Censored Observations 0 0 0 1 1 1
Right  Censored Observations 134 74 133 181 110 183
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.40
Test  of equality (p value): Edu 0.011 0.043 0.899 0.022 0.092 0.812
Panel  3
Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev 0.172 −0.001 −0.021 0.097 −0.024 0.041
(1.64) (−0.01) (−0.15) (1.29) (−0.29) (0.28)
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.722*** −0.314** −0.229 −0.423*** −0.521*** −0.184
(−4.47) (−2.46) (−1.12) (−3.88) (−3.26) (−0.70)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev 0.206* −0.007 0.009 0.143 0.021 0.053
(1.72) (−0.08) (0.06) (2.75) (0.25) (0.32)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) −0.656*** −0.302** −0.096 −0.327*** −0.461*** −0.077
(−4.41) (−2.43) (−0.52) (−3.31) (−3.24) (−0.38)
Predicted probability 85.40 80.51 86.10 88.02 85.71 88.35
Uncensored Observations 211 170 216 163 133 165
Left  Censored Observations 0 0 0 1 1 1
Right  Censored Observations 134 74 133 181 110 183
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.34 0.41
Test  of equality (p value):
Edu ∗ Crisis 0.000 0.014 0.286 0.001 0.002 0.452
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) 0.000 0.018 0.570 0.000 0.003 0.617
Edu  ∗ Fin.Dev 0.527 0.858 0.492 0.396 0.516 0.807
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev) 0.327 0.703 0.076 0.167 0.380 0.230Notes: The Table reports Tobit regressions with an upper bound of 90 and lower bound of 10 in columns 1–3 and Tobit regressions with an upper bound of
80  and lower bound of 20 in columns 4–6. The remaining speciﬁcations, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2–4. Statistical
signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.
Columns 1–3 of Table 6 present the results using the scaled equity home bias the main measures of education in three
panels that correspond to the estimated models. The baseline results in panel 1 are similar both quantitatively and quali-
tatively with those shown in Section 5.1, which demonstrates the stability of the baseline model. Taking into account the
differences between more and less ﬁnancially developed economies in panel 2, the results indicate that tertiary education
and mathematical numeracy reduce scaled equity home bias in less ﬁnancially developed economies signiﬁcantly compared
to more ﬁnancially developed economies. Further, in panel 3 we ﬁnd that this effect is stronger during the crisis period for
the less developed economies. To sum up, we conclude that our results are robust to an alternative measure of home bias.
We also re-estimate the models from Tables 2–4 using an alternative measure of ﬁnancial development and report the
results for the main measures of education in columns 4–6 of Table 6. In our main empirical results we used the average
stock market capitalisation as a sorting device for more and less developed economies. In order to ensure that our results
are not driven from the way that we divide our sample, we use a robust framework in order to achieve a good measure of
ﬁnancial development. In particular, we classify our countries into more and less ﬁnancially developed using the mean of
total value of stock traded to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio.29 We  construct a dummy  variable (Fin.Dev2) which takes
the value one for more developed economies and zero otherwise.
29 This variable has been employed in a number of recent studies such as Chinn and Ito (2006), Aizenman and Pasricha (2012) and Cˇihák et al. (2013) as
a  measure of ﬁnancial development. The data for total value of stock traded to GDP are drawn from the World Bank.
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Table  8
Robustness: regressions for different sub-samples.
Main measure Dependent variable = Equity home bias
Less ﬁnancially developed countries More ﬁnancially developed countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Panel 1
Education −0.226*** −0.108* −0.358* 0.172 0.176 −0.369
(−3.24) (−1.89) (−1.78) (1.09) (1.72) (−1.64)
Predicted probability 106.56 78.46 74.96 83.46 71.75 75.42
N  209 150 210 136 94 139
R2 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.97 0.98 0.90
Panel  2
Edu ∗ Crisis −0.281*** −0.096* −0.335 0.344 0.266 −0.537*
(−3.42) (−1.85) (−1.47) (1.53) (1.64) (−1.82)
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) −0.190** −0.042 −0.366* 0.306** 0.270 −0.344
(−2.21) (−1.15) (−1.81) (2.37) (1.66) (−1.49)
Predicted probability 84.97 74.79 74.96 72.34 60.07 75.90
N  209 150 210 136 94 139
R2 0.95 0.92 0.86 0.96 0.97 0.90
Test  of equality (p value):
Edu 0.002 0.061 0.805 0.787 0.005 0.336
Note: The table reports OLS regression results for less ﬁnancially developed countries in columns 1–3 and more ﬁnancially developed countries in columns
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g–6.  The remaining speciﬁcations, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2–4. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5%
**)  and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.
Our main ﬁndings are broadly conﬁrmed that increasing tertiary education and mathematical numeracy are likely to
ead to a reduction in the equity home bias. In addition, we conﬁrm our ﬁnding that this effect is more important in the
ess developed economies compared to their more developed counterparts, especially during the ﬁnancial crisis. Hence, we
onclude that our main empirical results are robust to an alternative deﬁnition of ﬁnancial development.
.3. Tobit regressions
We  employ a Tobit model to account for the fact that the dependent variable, equity home bias, is censored from above
nd below. Columns 1–3 of Table 7 report results of equity home bias with an upper limit of 90 and lower limit of 10, while
olumns 4–6 refer to an upper limit of 80 and a lower limit of 20 for the equity home bias.
The results conﬁrm a negative and signiﬁcant impact of tertiary education and mathematical numeracy on equity home
ias. Further, we ﬁnd that this negative effect is stronger for less ﬁnancially developed countries, compared to their more
eveloped counterparts. Finally, during both crisis and non-crisis periods education reduces equity home bias in less ﬁnan-
ially developed countries. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust to using Tobit models which account for the fact
hat the equity home bias is bounded from above and below.
.4. Regressions for different sub-samples
To conﬁrm that our results are not affected by any outliers i.e. countries which have extreme values of equity home
ias, we run the regressions separately for the two  groups of economies.30 Columns 1–3 of Table 8 present results for less
nancially developed countries and columns 4–6 show the results for more ﬁnancially developed countries. The baseline
esults in panel 1 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the main results. The estimates show a signiﬁcant and
egative impact of tertiary education and mathematical numeracy on equity home bias for the less ﬁnancially developed
ountries, while education has an insigniﬁcant impact for more ﬁnancially developed countries.
In panel 2 we take into account the crisis and non-crisis periods and the results show that education helps to reduce equity
ome bias for less developed countries in both crisis and non-crisis periods, while education has an insigniﬁcant impact
or more developed countries. The test of equality for education also shows a signiﬁcant difference between the coefﬁcient
alues in crisis and non-crisis periods for less developed countries. Overall, we conﬁrm that our results are qualitatively and
uantitatively similar to the main results.
30 In our main results instead of estimating the models for different sub-samples we  interact the education variable in all our speciﬁcations with dummy
ariables indicating different time periods or groups of economies. This approach allows us to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection; helps to
ain  degrees of freedom; and to take into consideration the fact that economies can transit between groups.
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7. Conclusion
A number of studies published recently have identiﬁed that education matters in affecting the process of ﬁnancial decision
making. In this paper we ask whether education makes countries more likely to display a lower degree of home bias. We
then take into account country-level heterogeneity and explore the above link when a crisis occurs. Credit availability has
been widely cited as a constraint to expansion in Western countries during the recent crisis, but lower levels of education
and habitual reliance on domestic portfolios could explain why home bias has remained at elevated levels in the developed
economies through the early stages of the ﬁnancial crisis.
This paper examines the impact of education on home bias in equity portfolios. Our results, based on a panel of economies
that exhibit substantial heterogeneity in ﬁnancial development during the period of 2001–2010, suggest that education plays
a crucial role in the reduction of home bias in equity holdings. After separating countries into more and less developed groups,
using average stock market capitalisation, we ﬁnd that less developed countries tend to beneﬁt more in terms of a reduction
in the equity home bias from an increase in the level of education compared to their more developed counterparts. We also
ﬁnd that the levels of education and numeracy of less ﬁnancially developed economies were more sensitive to equity home
bias during the global ﬁnancial crisis than the more developed economies.
Our results are also policy relevant. The results presented in this paper suggest that maintaining high levels of education
and numeracy would substantially increase international portfolio diversiﬁcation. Hence, embedding ﬁnancial education in
a curriculum should be high on a policymaker’s agenda, especially for emerging market economies.
Appendix.
Fig. A.1. Scatter plots for different measures of education and equity home bias. Note: The graph shows best ﬁtting regression lines for education and equity
home  bias. The dotted ﬁtted line is generated from regressions after dropping outliers in the 5% upper and lower tails of the distribution of the equity home
bias  variable.
Note: Country codes: 1 – Argentina, 2 – Australia, 3 – Austria, 4 – Brazil, 5 – Belgium, 6 – Chile, 7 – Colombia, 8 – Czech. Republic, 9 – Denmark, 10 – Egypt,
11  – Finland, 12 – France, 13 – Greece, 14 – Hungary, 15 – Hong Kong, 16 – India, 17 – Indonesia, 18 – Israel, 19 – Italy, 20 – Japan, 21 – Korea, 22 – Malaysia,
23  – Mexico, 24 – New Zealand, 25 – Norway, 26 – Netherlands, 27 – Philippines, 28 – Poland, 29 – Portugal, 30 – Russia, 31 – Spain, 32 – Sweden, 33 –
Switzerland, 34 – Thailand, 35 – Turkey, 36 – United Kingdom, 37 – United States, 38 – Venezuela (EHB).
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Table  A.1
Deﬁnitions of the variables.
Variables Description Source
Tertiary education This is measured as school enrolments to tertiary
education. Tertiary school enrolment is the total
enrolment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless
of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of
the ﬁve-year age group following on from secondary
school leaving.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Financial skills ‘Financial skills’ question reads as ‘ﬁnance skills readily
available’ and this statement is evaluated on a scale of
0–10.
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
(WCY)
PISA  Evaluates the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds in
mathematics.
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
(WCY)
Primary education Total enrolment in primary education, regardless of age,
expressed as a percentage of the population of ofﬁcial
primary education age.
IMD  World Competitiveness Yearbook
(WCY)
Fin.Dev This is a dummy  equal to one if a country’s stock market
capitalisation is greater than the average than the mean
and zero otherwise.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
GDP  growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Net inﬂows (new investment inﬂows less disinvestment)
in  the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is
divided by GDP.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services measured as a share of gross domestic product.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Labour force size Total labour force comprises people ages 15 and older who
supply labour for the production of goods and services
during a speciﬁed period.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
English legal origin This is a dummy  equal to one if a country has English as
the legal origin and zero otherwise.
La Porta et al. (2008)
Financial openness This variable includes the presence of multiple exchange
rates, the existence of restrictions on current account
transactions, the existence of restrictions on capital
account transactions and the requirement of the surrender
of export proceeds.
Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness
Market  turnover It is the total value of shares traded during the period
divided by the average market capitalisation for the period.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Domestic credit It refers to ﬁnancial resources provided to the private
sector by ﬁnancial corporations, such as through loans,
purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and
other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for
repayment.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Stock market capitalisation Market capitalisation is the share price times the number
of shares outstanding of listed companies as a percentage
of  GDP.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Current ratio It is the ratio of total current assets to total current
liabilities.
DataStream
Leverage It is the ratio of total debt to total assets. DataStream
Euro Euro is a dummy equal to one if a country is a member of
the Euro-area and zero otherwise.
Eurozone website
Unemployment rate The share of the labour force that is without work but
available for and seeking employment.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
of World Bank
Note: The table reports the exact deﬁnition of the variables used in the models.
Table A.2
Distribution of the equity home bias and measures of education over 2001–2010.
Country Average equity home bias (%) Tertiary education PISA score Financial skills
Argentina 86.53 66.33 385.34 63.65
Australia 79.40 72.75 518.84 75.45
Austria 50.60 52.72 502.02 74.31
Brazil  97.40 21.91 372.35 60.54
Belgium 45.87 62.64 520.61 70.55
Chile  82.63 50.36 417.18 75.67
Colombia 96.89 30.89 376.50 65.23
Czech  Republic 82.35 47.63 505.00 53.83
Denmark 57.22 72.64 509.61 77.14
Egypt  98.39 30.98 – –
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Country Average equity home bias (%) Tertiary education PISA score Financial skills
Finland 59.03 90.56 544.32 75.82
France 66.18 54.65 499.87 70.00
Greece 90.51 78.18 458.24 60.66
Hong  Kong 77.60 42.99 550.75 76.69
Hungary 82.43 58.15 490.42 63.33
India 97.92 12.65 – 73.73
Indonesia 99.43 17.64 375.87 47.35
Israel  90.10 57.81 444.86 76.84
Italy  54.57 61.89 470.73 53.11
Japan  78.65 55.53 528.03 56.33
Malaysia 96.38 30.63 – 67.93
Mexico 98.10 24.60 405.31 49.74
Netherlands 33.47 59.15 530.68 73.32
New  Zealand 57.24 76.81 521.23 64.23
Norway 45.35 75.50 494.18 70.05
Philippines 99.52 28.70 – 72.66
Poland 96.57 64.46 493.84 50.56
Portugal 57.67 56.99 473.89 56.58
Russia 98.51 70.32 470.81 60.91
South  Korea 92.82 94.99 545.63 54.50
Spain  85.39 67.85 482.54 60.00
Sweden 56.46 76.22 500.96 76.37
Switzerland 57.30 46.54 530.61 79.07
Thailand 98.33 43.33 417.62 57.54
Turkey 99.57 35.49 431.77 68.51
UK  56.48 59.35 493.62 64.90
USA  42.77 82.90 481.41 77.05
Venezuela 95.28 55.22 – 49.64
Note: The table reports the average equity home bias and different measures of education.
Table A.3
Diagnostic and identiﬁcation statistics from ﬁrst-stage IV regressions.
Main measure (1) (2) (3)
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
Panel 1
Unemployment rate −0.790**
(−2.07)
−0.083
(−0.08)
−0.170
(−0.92)
Primary education −0.973***
(−4.17)
−2.219***
(−2.80)
−0.299**
(−2.39)
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.037 0.000 0.002
N  320 222 316
R2 0.78 0.97 0.78
Panel  2
Edu ∗ (Fin.Dev):
Unemployment rate 0.595***
(3.69)
1.288
(1.07)
0.102
(0.87)
Primary education 0.228*
(1.77)
2.735***
(4.60)
0.436***
(6.75)
F  test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.019 0.065 0.373
N  321 230 315
R2 0.96 0.99 0.99
Edu  ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev):
Unemployment rate −1.318***
(−4.32)
−1.034
(−1.21)
−0.438**
(−2.29)
Primary education −0.650***
(−3.76)
−5.188***
(−11.47)
−0.520***
(−4.30)
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Table  A.3 (Continued)
Main measure (1) (2) (3)
Tertiary education PISA Financial skills
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.000 0.003 0.000
N  321 230 315
R2 0.95 0.99 0.98
Panel  3
Edu ∗ Crisis ∗ Fin.Dev:
Unemployment rate 2.147***
(4.22)
−1.171
(−0.85)
0.234
(0.29)
Primary education 0.162
(0.95)
1.778***
(3.91)
0.358
(1.49)
F  test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.002 0.009 0.999
N  300 225 316
R2 0.91 0.99 0.76
Edu  ∗ Crisis ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev):
Unemployment rate −1.108**
(−2.51)
−3.950*
(−1.70)
0.167
(0.38)
Primary education −0.060
(−0.34)
−2.799***
(−3.88)
−0.482***
(−2.99)
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.012 0.292 0.645
N  300 225 316
R2 0.91 0.99 0.90
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ Fin.Dev:
Unemployment rate −1.260***
(−2.58)
1.898
(1.21)
−0.033
(−0.04)
Primary education −0.180
(−0.95)
1.949***
(3.50)
0.074
(0.29)
F  test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.015 0.011 0.999
N  300 225 316
R2 0.93 0.99 0.82
Edu  ∗ (1 − Crisis) ∗ (1 − Fin.Dev):
Unemployment rate 0.083
(0.26)
1.089
(0.39)
−0.812*
(−1.75)
Primary education −0.324
(−1.62)
−4.181***
(−4.79)
−0.078
(−0.42)
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angrist–Pischke chi-square test 0.092 0.681 0.710
N  300 225 316
R2 0.92 0.98 0.91
Note: The Table reports ﬁrst-stage regressions for the two instruments of education- unemployment rate (%) and primary education (%). The F statistic
provides a test of excluded instruments and Angrist–Pischke chi-square test is a test of under-identiﬁcation under the null that the particular endogenous
regressor in question is unidentiﬁed. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.
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Table A.4
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables.
EHB Scaled
EHB
Fin.
skills
PISA Ter.
edu.
Pri.
edu.
GDP gr. FDI Trade Labour
size
English Fin.
open.
Turnover
ratio
Dom.
credit
Current
ratio
Lev. Euro Market
cap.
Stock
traded
Unemp
EHB 1.00
Scaled EHB 0.97a 1.00
Fin. skills −0.38a −0.35a 1.00
PISA −0.55a −0.54a 0.40a 1.00
Ter.  edu −0.49a −0.46a 0.11b 0.57a 1.00
Pri.  edu. 0.13b 0.10c −0.15a −0.45a −0.30a 1.00
GDP  gr. 0.37a 0.37a −0.00 −0.25a −0.22a 0.39 1.00
FDI  −0.14a −0.15a 0.15b 0.20a −0.01 −0.13b 0.05 1.00
Trade  −0.10 −0.14a 0.21a 0.39a −0.07 −0.31b 0.06 0.58a 1.00
Labour  size 0.19a 0.28a 0.03 −0.42a −0.37a 0.14b 0.23a −0.14a −0.25a 1.00
English  −0.01 0.06 0.27a 0.12c −0.05 −0.24a 0.11b 0.09c 0.26a 0.30a 1.00
Fin.  open. −0.68a −0.66a 0.26a 0.54a 0.39a −0.21a −0.33a 0.21a 0.17a −0.37a −0.06 1.00
Turnover  ratio −0.35a −0.27a 0.10c 0.37a 0.40a −0.21a −0.11b 0.02 −0.05 0.17a 0.13b 0.19a 1.00
Dom.  credit −0.56a −0.48a 0.23a 0.46a 0.30a −0.16a −0.33a 0.02 0.09c −0.06 0.23a 0.55a 0.42a 1.00
Current  ratio −0.03 −0.04 −0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.02 −0.13b −0.04 0.06 −0.03 0.01 0.02  0.04  −0.00 1.00
Lev.  −0.12b −0.12b −0.02 −0.12c 0.11b 0.04 −0.24a −0.14a −0.22a 0.03 −0.02 0.11b 0.08  0.14a −0.09c 1.00
Euro  −0.45a −0.49a 0.03 0.22a 0.25a 0.10c −0.25a 0.05 0.01 −0.19a −0.31a 0.43a 0.13b 0.21a −0.06 0.27a 1.00
Market  cap. −0.15a −0.11b 0.43a 0.38a 0.06 −0.23a 0.08 0.45a 0.65a −0.05 0.40a 0.25a 0.17a 0.34a −0.05 −0.14a −0.10c 1.00
Stock  traded −0.32a −0.24a 0.30a 0.43a 0.26a −0.21a −0.05 0.37a 0.40a 0.03 0.31a 0.30a 0.61a 0.46a 0.00 −0.06 0.00  0.77a 1.00
Unemp  0.32a 0.30a −0.17a −0.28a −0.06 0.29a −0.05 −0.09c −0.27a −0.13b −0.036a −0.17a −0.28a −0.35a 0.03 0.14a 0.09c −0.26a −0.29a 1.00
Note: The table reports the pairwise correlation matrix between different explanatory variables used in the models. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c). Abbreviations:  Fin. skills, ﬁnancial
skills;  Ter. edu, tertiary education; Pri.edu, primary education; GDP gr., GDP growth; English, English legal origin dummy; Fin. Open., ﬁnancial openness; Dom. Credit, domestic credit; Lev., leverage; Euro, Euro
dummy;  Market cap., stock market capitalisation; Unemp, unemployment rate.
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